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A recently popular framework in the cognitive sciences takes the human nervous system
to be a hierarchically arranged Bayesian prediction machine. In this paper, we examine
psychological trauma through the lens of this framework. We suggest that this can help
us to understand the nature of trauma, and the different effects that different kinds of
trauma can have. We end by exploring synergies between our approach and current
theories of PTSD, and gesture toward future directions.
Keywords: predictive processing, Bayesian brain hypothesis, trauma, nervous system, PTSD, psychosis
INTRODUCTION
Psychological trauma, often encountered under the diagnostic category of post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), occurs in a wide variety of contexts and has a variety of symptomatic
presentations (see, e.g., Bisson et al., 2015). In this paper, we suggest that, if we view the nervous
system as a hierarchically arranged Bayesian prediction machine, we can better understand the
nature of psychological trauma, and the different effects that different kinds of trauma can have on
the human mind. In particular, we will demonstrate how such an approach can help us to shed light
on three things. The first is the nature of the phenomenon known as “dissociation.” The second
is the underlying nature of the difference between what has been called “Type 1” and “Type 2”
trauma (now a widely used distinction first introduced by Terr, 1991). The third concerns the fact
that trauma is not only associated with PTSD, but also with psychosis. We suggest why this might
be so, and why certain types of trauma, at certain periods in the life-course, might be more likely to
lead to psychosis than to PTSD. We end by exploring synergies between our approach and current
theories of PTSD, and point toward future clinical and research directions.
WHAT DO WE MEAN BY PTSD?
Post-traumatic stress disorder, like so many diagnostic categories, is broad and heterogeneous. In
the most general sense, PTSD occurs when a traumatic one–off event or extended period leaves its
mark on the human nervous system, giving rise to undesirable symptoms. These symptoms vary
(see, e.g., American Psychiatric Association, 2013), but include disturbing and intrusive thoughts,
feelings, or dreams related to the traumatic phenomena, distress in the presence of trauma-
related cues, attempts to avoid trauma-related cues, alterations in how a person thinks and feels,
heightened arousal, and hyper-vigilance1. A particularly well-known symptom of PTSD, probably
in part because it captures the public imagination, involves vivid recollections or re-livings of the
traumatic events, which are often referred to as “flashbacks.”
We have spoken not only of traumatic events but also of extended periods of trauma. This
corresponds to two broadly different kinds of stressor that tend to be associated with PTSD (Terr,
1991; Courtois and Ford, 2009). The first, which is perhaps the most commonly appreciated,
1These symptoms are often divided into three “symptom clusters,” namely, (i) intrusive phenomena, (ii) arousal symptoms,
and (iii) avoidance symptoms.
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involves a one–off and usually life-threatening event of
cataclysmic significance. This is sometimes referred to as “Type
1 trauma.” The second involves an extended period of exposure
to trauma, often in the form of heightened perceived threat.
Here the lasting psychological impact comes from a temporally
extended need to stay vigilant in the face of an ongoing
expectation of impending harm. This occurs, for example, during
extended periods of childhood or domestic abuse, or during
extended periods as a combatant in a war zone (Doctor and
Shiromoto, 2009). This is sometimes referred to as “Type 2
trauma”2.
THE PREDICTIVE PROCESSING
FRAMEWORK
Most accounts of PTSD (some of which we will examine later)
start with the symptoms of PTSD and try to explain them.
Our methodology is importantly different. We start with a
framework for thinking about the human nervous system, and
think about how, in the light of this framework, trauma, and
different types of trauma, might affect the human mind. We
proceed on the basis that a good current understanding of
the nervous system is captured by the predictive processing
framework (PPF) (Friston, 2005; Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013).
Adopting such a framework paints an accurate picture of
the effects that trauma has on the nervous system, and
also points us toward exciting future theoretical and clinical
directions.
The application of the PPF to various mental disorders
and conditions is not new. For example, it has been applied
to psychosis (Fletcher and Frith, 2009), auditory verbal
hallucination (Wilkinson, 2014), autism (Pellicano and Burr,
2012), hysteria (Edwards et al., 2012), and stress (Peters et al.,
2017). To our knowledge, it has not been applied to psychological
trauma.
At this point it is important to clarify that we view the PPF as
precisely that, namely, a framework [see Wilkinson (2014) for an
explanation of the difference between frameworks, theories, and
models]. By this we mean that it is a useful way of thinking about a
certain domain of interest, which is one of many other potentially
equally valid and useful ways of thinking. The nervous system
doesn’t literally make predictions, draw inferences, or select
hypotheses [strictly speaking, only persons as a whole literally do
these things (Ryle, 1949)] but it can be helpfully thought of as
doing these things. Our commitment to this sort of pragmatism
is reflected in our final section, where we see our proposals as
complementing, rather than conflicting with, existing accounts
of PTSD.
The Information-Processing Framework
A great deal of work within the cognitive sciences has taken
place within a very broad framework that we might call the
2Some theorists use the term “complex trauma” or “complex PTSD” in a way
that is synonymous with “Type 2 trauma.” At other times it seems to refer to a
combination of Type 1 and Type 2 symptoms.
“information-processing framework” (Broadbent, 1958). This
does not pick out any particular theories or models, but forms a
broad background assumption about the fundamental nature of
cognition, against which such theories or models are built [Marr’s
(1982) account of vision is one canonical example]. According
to this framework, the nervous system’s main task is to process
information from the outside world. This information comes in
the form of impacts upon our sensory receptors. When such
information arrives, it gets passed along a processing chain,
which, stage by stage, processes the information until there is
something that corresponds to our rich perceptual experience in
all its complexity and sophistication.
There is a huge amount of variation among the theories and
models that fall within this information-processing framework.
For example, many models don’t think of processing as only
being “bottom-up,” but also allow for various “top-down”
influences [see Neisser (1976) for an early example of this]. It is
therefore inaccurate to say that the framework is characterized
by a uniquely bottom-up direction of processing. What does,
however, characterize the information-processing framework
concerns what the relevant causal and temporal antecedents
of a given perceptual experience are. The information-
processing framework will say that the relevant antecedents
are environmental events, and information from those events.
Models or theories that allow top-down influences simply
say that these impacts on how that incoming information
is received, processed, and passed on. Top-down influences
notwithstanding, any given perceptual experience is preceded
by the relevant environmental event (which the experience is
often thought to somehow represent) and constructed out of
information from that event.
Two caveats are in order at this point. First, the focus
in presenting the information-processing framework has been
on perception and the processing of information from the
environment. There are, within the information-processing
framework, accounts of all aspects of cognition, and not
just perception (e.g., action, memory, imagery, etc.). However,
perception is the simplest for the purposes of presenting the
framework. The second caveat is that we are not primarily seeking
to criticize the information-processing framework, but rather
wish to use it as an illustrative contrast against which to present
the PPF that we will be working within.
Useful though it may be, the information-processing
framework has some shortcomings. First of all, it requires the
nervous system to wait for events in the world to happen, and
for information from those events to reach it. One might expect
the nervous system to have evolved to be more pro-active,
more anticipatory. Secondly, according to the framework, the
information that comes in early on in processing is relatively
noisy, and then, as it gets passed on, it gets more and more
complex and fine-grained. Given that on this model the
information at each stage is explicitly represented in neural
activity, this means that, as we go up the processing chain, things
get progressively more and more complicated, and more and
more costly in terms of the using of neural resources. One might
expect the nervous system to be more efficient in its use of
resources. There is an alternative framework that presents the
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nervous system as both pro-active and cost-effective. This is the
framework we present now.
The Predictive Processing Framework
As an Alternative
There is a different way of thinking about what the nervous
system does, and about the fundamental nature of its relationship
to the environment. Although this framework has recently picked
up many adherents, its roots go back at least as far as von
Helmholtz (1866/1962).
Instead of thinking of the nervous system as responding
to – and constructing experience out of – impressions on the
nervous system, we can instead think of it as actively predicting
(or attempting to predict) rather than passively responding to
sensory information. Conscious experience, on this view, is not
constructed out of sensory information after the relevant event,
but is constituted by your nervous system’s best predictions, and
thereby stays one step ahead of what’s happening in the outside
world. This of course is not to say that the environment plays
no role: it plays a crucial, but somewhat different one. It keeps
our predictions in check; it keeps them accurate and world-
directed. Thus, experience, though massively flexible (and more
flexible than in the information-processing framework) isn’t an
“anything goes” situation; it is still, at least usually (hallucinations
and delusions aside), answerable to what is going on in the world.
To understand the PPF in more detail, it is worth reflecting on
two things: ambiguity and efficiency; in particular, the ambiguity
present in (even the cleanest) sensory signals, and the fact that the
nervous system has to operate as efficiently as possible.
The nervous system’s main task is to settle on a hypothesis
about what is going on, based on ambiguous input. This
ambiguity means that a number of different hypotheses are
compatible with the input (and, indeed, the same hypothesis
is compatible with different inputs). Given this, how does the
nervous system settle on one hypothesis rather than another? It
needs to take something else into account: not just the fit of the
hypothesis with the input, but also how statistically likely that
hypothesis is, independently of that particular input. This is called
the “prior probability” of the hypothesis, and will often, but not
always (it is arguably sometimes a function of innate biases), be
assigned as a result of past experience. As a result, a hypothesis
could fit the input extremely well, but its prior probability could
be so low that it isn’t even considered. Conversely, a hypothesis
could have such a high prior probability, that, even though it
doesn’t fit the input well, it is settled upon. What we have just
described is Bayesian inference, and the PPF can be helpfully
thought of as a neural implementation of this Bayesian strategy.
One nice illustration of a case where a hypothesis has such
a high probability, but doesn’t fit the input very well, is the
case of the Hollow Mask Illusion. When you are presented
with a rotating mask that is slowly turned to present you with
the concave back of the mask, your nervous system “corrects”
the concave stimulus into a convex stimulus. You experience the
concave back of the mask as convex. This is due to the “convex
face hypothesis” having such a high prior probability that it over-
rides the incoming signal. This is because faces are extremely
important stimuli, and your nervous system has the expectation
that the faces you will encounter will always be convex. The prior
probability of the “convex face” hypothesis is so high that, even
though the “concave face” hypothesis would better match the
input, it is never selected.
As a result of selection pressures, the nervous system will
implement this disambiguation strategy as efficiently as possible.
“Efficiently,” in this instance, means performing the inference as
quickly, as accurately, and with as little energy expenditure as
possible. Of course, speed, accuracy, and energy expenditure tend
to pull in opposing directions. The faster you go, the less accurate
you are likely to be and the more energy you will expend. Again,
if you are trying to be too accurate, you will take too long, and
expend more energy than is necessary, and so on. As a result of
this, it is a matter of finding an optimal trade-off between these
three desirables [see Peters et al. (2017) for an account of when
this trade-off fails in cases of stress].
For now, it is important to note that the way in which
the Bayesian strategy is implemented in the nervous system
is highly efficient, and this is where the notion of prediction
comes in. Predictive strategies are used to maximize efficiency
in informatics. In fact, it forms the basic principle of data
compression. You save on bandwidth, when passing a message,
by only passing on what is newsworthy. What counts as
“newsworthy” is simply what the receiver of the message hasn’t
already predicted, namely, prediction error. Of course, what
counts as the “sender” and “receiver” of the message in the case
of the nervous system are predominantly within it, namely, they
are different parts of the nervous system, of which the most
substantial part is of course the brain.
This counts as an implementation of a Bayesian strategy
insofar as the selection of a hypothesis determines a set of
predictions about subsequent inputs, namely, inputs that are
compatible with the hypothesis. If the hypothesis predicts inputs
well, it will be kept. If it predicts them badly, it will be tweaked
or abandoned altogether in favor of another hypothesis. In other
words, one hypothesis is selected rather than another if it better
minimizes prediction error.
Two Further Developments: Precision
and Hierarchy
There are two important ways in which the PPF can be developed
further. One concerns “precision weighting,” and the other the
“hierarchical arrangement of hypotheses.” We take these in turn.
Precision Weighting
Although incoming signals are ambiguous, in different contexts,
the degree of ambiguity will differ. To maximize its predictions,
the nervous system needs to accurately estimate how much
ambiguity (uncertainty) there will be. In other words, it needs to
make second-order predictions, namely, predictions about how
much it should rely on its predictions (which amounts to how
much it should pay heed to the prediction error).
In contexts where low ambiguity is expected (high signal-to-
noise ratio), higher precision will be estimated, and the prediction
error will be taken more seriously. Conversely, when there is
high ambiguity (or, through some top-down influence, there is
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low interest in the stimulus), low precision is estimated, and
the prediction error will be taken less seriously. This is called
“precision weighting,” which amounts to turning up (or down)
“the gain” on prediction error, and is taken to be modulated
by neurotransmitters such as dopamine (Corlett et al., 2010).
The role of precision weighting has taken center-stage in many
PPF accounts of psychopathology (see, e.g., Edwards et al., 2012;
Adams et al., 2013). Within this framework, turning up precision
corresponds to increased attention, i.e., attending selectively to
precise, newsworthy information. As a result, these accounts
take pathological symptoms to be the result of attentional
abnormalities under this somewhat broad and neurobiologically
informed construal of attention (Hohwy, 2012).
The Hierarchical Arrangement of Hypotheses
The second important further development of the PPF is
that these hypotheses are hierarchically organized. They are
hierarchically organized in two different but complimentary
senses. The first sense is that the hypotheses of one level
provide the inputs for the next level (for evidence of hierarchical
processing in the brain, see Felleman and Van Essen, 1991). The
second is that the nature of the hypotheses differs depending on
where they are in the hierarchy. “Higher” parts of the hierarchy
are, roughly, those parts that are further away from the sensory
stimulus. These tend to be at a lower temporal timescale, and a
higher level of abstraction. They might correspond to abstract
generalizations, such as the belief that lions are dangerous.
“Lower” parts of the hierarchy are closer to the sensory stimulus.
These tend to be at higher temporal frequencies, and at low levels
of abstraction. These, for example, correspond to early stages of
visual processing: your nervous system’s early statistically driven
attempts to make sense of noisy inputs. Of course, in order to
express these neurally encoded predictions we need to use rough-
and-ready descriptions in natural language (in this case English;
“Light tends to come from above”/“This is a face”), but there is
nothing linguistic about the priors/hypotheses themselves.
Let us take an example [adapted from Pezzulo (2013)] to
illustrate the predictive hierarchy. Suppose that, on the basis of a
noise, which you take to be a squeaking window, two hypotheses
present themselves about what is going on: either the wind blew
the window, or a thief is clambering into your house. At the
stage where those two hypotheses are competing, a great deal
of ambiguity has already been resolved, in a Bayesian fashion,
at lower levels of the hierarchy. This can be represented in the
Figure 1.
Schematically put, the low-level sensory information is noisy
and ambiguous, so lower levels of the hierarchy select hypotheses
that determine what the sound is like qualitatively speaking (its
loudness, pitch, and timbre)3. These features themselves remain
ambiguous, and so, slightly further up the hierarchy, there is a
further disambiguation about what the sound is (its significance,
what caused it), and so the hypothesis that it is a squeaking
window rather than, say, a chirping bird, is selected. Once the
“squeaking window” hypothesis has been settled upon, there
3We say that this is “schematically put” because each of the “levels” in the hierarchy
represented in the diagram here are actually made up of countless “sub-levels,”
which cannot be easily represented in words or diagrams.
may be further disambiguation regarding the significance of the
squeaking window: was it a burglar, or was it the wind? This
hypothesis, like the hypotheses lower in the hierarchy, will be
selected in a Bayesian manner. Both hypotheses have a good
fit (it they were correct, they would produce the “squeaking
window” sound), but they may have different prior probabilities.
For example, if the crime rates in the area are very low, and you
know it is a windy night, the “wind” hypothesis would have a
greater prior probability, and would be selected.
Some Important Consequences
The PPF has some important consequences for our
understanding of trauma and its effects on the human mind.
Firstly, according to the PPF, conscious experience is much
less reliant on input. Indeed conscious experience is simply
a function of your nervous system’s best hypothesis, so, in
principle, doesn’t need any input at all (indeed we see this not
only in hallucinations, but also in dreams and in imagery and
imagination). The role of input, as we have seen, is only to
keep the nervous system’s hypotheses on track. This means that
when we come to explain experiences that correspond badly
to what is going on in the world, like hallucinations, we don’t
so much need to ask ourselves, where did all of this input (or
the illusion of this input) come from? Instead we ask: why
did the nervous system adopt this erroneous hypothesis? And
because our nervous system’s hypothesis building is largely
self-generated, and only kept accurate by a very delicate process
of correction, this doesn’t only make the explanatory task more
palatable, it also has a welcome normalizing effect. The nervous
system of a normally perceiving organism and the nervous
system of a hallucinating organism are much more similar to one
another within the PPF than within the information-processing
framework. Indeed, according to the PPF, perception just is
controlled hallucination. All of this, which applies to a better
understanding of hallucination (Wilkinson, 2014), also applies
to flashbacks. Indeed, as we are about to see, flashbacks can be
understood as your nervous system generating a very specific
hypothesis in contexts where it is inappropriate to do so.
A second vital consequence of the PPF does not pertain
to symptoms of trauma, but rather to how trauma affects the
nervous system. According to the PPF, processing and learning
(e.g., perception and perceptual learning) are two sides of the
same coin. There is no sharp division between a programming
phase and a deployment phase. Our nervous systems “learn on
the job,” so to speak.
On many standard models, especially classical computa-
tionalist ones, the nervous system is like a computer: the
processing and the learning are kept very separate. Therefore,
trauma can only be understood as an event that has been so
extreme to process, that it has somehow broken the system. One
upshot of this is that traumatic experience and non-traumatic
experience are radically different in kind: while the latter uses
the system, the former breaks it. The PPF, on the other hand,
views all encounters with the world as involving learning to some
degree. It is just that a traumatic experience involves a great deal
of learning for a very specific context that is maladaptive in the
vast majority of contexts that the person is likely to find herself
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FIGURE 1 | A schematic representation of a predictive processing hierarchy.
in. But the fundamental process of a traumatic and non-traumatic
experience is fundamentally the same4.
Another upshot of the PPF is that it can account for why, in
different phases of the life-course, the nervous system is more
susceptible to trauma. As we just said, processing and learning
are two sides of the same coin: our nervous systems learn on the
job. But, they tend to learn more, and more rapidly, the earlier
on in the job they are, since they are laying down priors anew.
Therefore, the younger someone is when they are subjected to
trauma, the more profound and generalized the (in this case
maladaptive) learning will be. This idea will become very relevant
when we come to examine post-traumatic psychosis.
Finally, and in a related manner, the PPF gives us the tools,
with its central notion of hierarchy, to make sense of when the
hypothesis-selection of someone’s nervous system will simply
give rise to a low-level sensory anomaly, or when, at the other
extreme, it will constitute the subject’s world-view.
PREDICTIVE PROCESSING AND
TRAUMA
Not only does the PPF have the means to explain the effects of
traumatic experience on the nervous system more generally, it
also has the structural resources to explain the differing effects of
4In a related manner, this suggests that there is no clean distinction between
traumatic and non-traumatic events: they are on a spectrum.
different kinds of trauma. The differences we present (which we
do not take to be exhaustive by any means) are, first, between
Type 1 and Type 2 trauma, and, second, between PTSD and
trauma-based psychosis. But first, we show how it can help to
account for a phenomenon that is central to trauma, namely,
dissociation.
Dissociation
It is widely accepted that trauma can lead to dissociation [see,
e.g., van der Kolk and Fisler (1995), Putnam et al. (1996),
and many more], and that dissociation is in turn associated
with a number of mental disorders, including psychosis, PTSD,
depersonalization disorder (DPD) (see, e.g., Moscowitz et al.,
2008). The concept of dissociation is intended to capture a
certain detachment or disconnection that someone might feel
toward their current perceptions and emotions, or toward their
experiences of the world around them more generally (Lynn and
Rhue, 1994). In relation to trauma, dissociation comes in two
very different varieties: peritraumatic and post-traumatic (Ursano
et al., 1999). Peritraumatic dissociation consists in a detachment
from what is happening during a traumatic event [it can also
lead to amnesia with regards to that event (e.g., Freyd, 1994)].
Post-traumatic dissociation consists in a general and more long-
lasting sense of detachment from the world in the aftermath of
a traumatic event. In extreme cases, this leads to a diagnosis
of DPD.
Dissociation in general, and these types of dissociation in
particular, can be nicely accommodated within the PPF. The
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crucial notion within the PPF for this purpose is the notion of
hierarchy. To state the account plainly, and subsequently flesh it
out: dissociation involves a disconnection of the lower levels of
the hierarchy from the higher levels.
Recall that the lower levels of the hierarchy deal with more
sensory and concrete happenings in the world, and operate at
faster timescales. Thus, at these lower levels your nervous system
selects hypotheses about what is happening in terms of shapes,
colors, sounds, and at mid-levels, in terms of objects and events.
However, an extremely important feature of the overall multi-
level hypothesis that constitutes a normal experience is not just
that this is all happening, but it is happening to you. Thus,
built into the overall hypothesis is a self-model. How this self-
model is constructed and fits into your nervous system’s dynamic
hypothesis construction is currently being explored [see Letheby
and Gerrans (2017) and Millière (2017) who both examine ego
dissolution from within the PPF]. Whatever the finer details,
it would certainly be very high up in the hierarchy: a-modal,
highly abstract, temporally extended over long timescales, etc.
If the prediction-error (bottom-up signaling) from the low-level
and mid-level hypotheses is blocked or down-modulated, the
resulting experience will be one where something is happening
(colors and sounds at the lower levels, objects and events at
higher levels, etc.), but it is not experienced as happening to me.
If this is short-lived and occurs only during a traumatic event,
then what we are talking about is peritraumatic dissociation. If
this is a general state of affairs that is brought to bear on the
experience of the world generally, then we are talking about post-
traumatic dissociation, and potentially a dissociative disorder (or
even depersonalization).
This is what dissociation looks like within the PPF, but
why would it occur? Most models of peritraumatic dissociation
build on the classic work of Janet (1904) who claimed that
dissociation was a protective mechanism, allowing traumatic
experiences and memories to be compartmentalized and thereby
minimize distress (see, e.g., van der Hart et al., 2010). We think
that this is undoubtedly along the right lines. Within the PPF,
distress, namely, the subjective experience of strong negative
affect, is to be understood as the generation of a hypothesis
about what is happening to oneself that is mainly designed to
minimize prediction error from interoceptive sources (namely,
bodily change) (see Seth, 2013). One way to minimize distress
would be to hypothesize that the events are not happening to
oneself. Then, in line with this, the relevant bodily changes are
also not hypothesized to be taking place, and, as a result, the
negative affect is then heavily, or perhaps even entirely, mitigated.
So far this is in keeping with the vast majority of accounts
of why dissociation takes place (see Dell and O’Neil, 2009). But
such accounts view the natural drive toward minimizing negative
affect as so self-evident (indeed, even trivial) that this amounts to
an explanatory bedrock. Within the PPF we can take things one
step further by reflecting on the biological nature and purpose
of negative affect. It is to motivate the organism to get rid of
it, to make it act so as to improve its current situation (Van
de Cruys, 2017). Thus, the PPF’s re-framing of the dissociative
mechanism is not just about the negativity of the event, but also
about one’s helplessness in the face of the event in question [see
Peters et al. (2017) for an account of stress within the PPF along
these lines]. The negative affect is quarantined (and ultimately
reduced/eliminated) through dissociation when it is clear that it
can no longer be of help to you: it cannot motivate you to get out
of the current situation because it is clear that you can’t get out
of it5.
One outstanding question is: What makes dissociation persist
in cases of post-traumatic dissociation? The more obvious answer
is to say that we are talking about a similar state to the
state of peritraumatic dissociation, but where the drive toward
distress-minimization (self-protection) is extended through time.
Everything the dissociated subject experiences (and not just the
traumatic event) is happening but is not happening to them.
A less obvious answer would be to say that post-traumatic
dissociation is, in spite of superficial similarities, different in its
underlying nature from peritraumatic dissociation. Perhaps, for
example, the self-model is not disconnected from lower levels of
the hierarchy, but has somehow been broken or disintegrated.
The possibility of this happening, and how it might happen, is
at this stage highly speculative, but this is an interesting area for
future research and theorizing [the work of Letheby and Gerrans
(2017) and Millière (2017) on ego dissolution in the context of
psychedelic drug-taking might offer some clues here].
Type 1 vs. Type 2 Trauma
In Type 1 trauma, a single traumatic event of cataclysmic and
usually life-threatening significance leaves its mark of person’s
nervous system. The symptoms of Type 1 trauma tend to be
distress in the presence, and avoidance, of cues that are a
reminiscent of the event. Sometimes these environmental or even
self-produced cues (e.g., patterns of thinking/imagery) yield vivid
flashbacks (Brewin et al., 2012).
Here is how the PPF makes sense of Type 1 trauma. What
happens, when the traumatic event is experienced, is that a multi-
level hypothesis is selected which corresponds to the conscious
experience of the traumatic event. Part of that hypothesis, that
conscious experience, is its life-threatening significance. As a
result, selecting that hypothesis is something that your nervous
system just cannot miss in the future6. What this amounts to
in Bayesian terms is a hypothesis that, due to its importance
for survival, is given an unusually high prior probability. That
biases the selection of that hypothesis such that it will be selected
even when the fit with the input is relatively poor. And, as we
saw, hypothesis selection determines the conscious experience at
that time. That is why something merely reminiscent, even only
vaguely so, can act as a trigger, and lead to a vivid reliving of
the event. Thanks to the hierarchy, this needn’t be experienced
as an actual reliving of the event. The higher-level hypothesis
concerning where and when the subject is remains intact (and
5Nowhere is this more starkly illustrated than in the context of torture (Nickerson
et al., 2016).
6From a different perspective, this can be understood in terms of error-
management theory (EMT) [see Dodgson and Gordon (2009) for an application
of EMT to auditory hallucinations]. EMT effectively states that it is adaptive
for an organism’s nervous system to err on the side of caution by biasing its
reasoning in favor of false positives in matters pertaining to fitness (i.e., survival
or reproduction).
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hence accurate) and therefore there is often an awareness that,
although intensely unpleasant, and potentially highly disruptive,
this is “just a flashback” (Brewin, 2015).
Matters are further aggravated since the perceived fit of the
hypothesis is made stronger by interoceptive feedback loops.
What we mean is that, not only is the hypothesis of supreme
significance, it is also heavily affectively charged. Thus, it needn’t
be that something reminiscent of the traumatic event be directly
mistaken by your nervous system for the traumatic event itself.
Rather, what will often happen is that the trigger will give rise
to an interoceptive affective state that will itself need explaining
along with the sensory evidence (Pezzulo, 2013). To take an
example, if you return to Figure 1, suppose you have just seen
a horror movie and are in a generalized state of fear. The
“wind” hypothesis may have a higher prior probability, but
the burglar hypothesis would now have a better fit, since it
would not only explain the squeaking window, but also the fear
that you feel. Similarly with trauma, the traumatic hypothesis
has better fit since it not only explains (albeit poorly) the
sensory evidence; it does a pretty good job of explaining your
affective state too. This is a “feedback loop” because the trigger
need only initially result in a relatively mild emotional state,
which then promotes something closer to the trauma hypothesis,
which in turn will lead to a stronger emotional state, which in
turn will lead to a more determinate and negative hypothesis,
etc. In short, there is a vicious cycle leading to progressively
more powerful affective states, and progressively more negative
hypotheses that are drafted in to explain them away (this can
also be put in terms of “circular inference,” see Jardri and Deneve,
2013).
In Type 2 trauma, what we have is a more general type of
learning, over an extended period of time. The result of this
is an impression, built up from statistical regularities in past
experience, that the world is not generally a kind or safe place.
What this does is lead to more general biasing toward threatening
hypotheses, rather than the reliving of a very specific, rich, and
multi-level hypothesis (as is the case with Type 1 trauma).
This means that events are given more negative and
threatening interpretations than they warrant, which in turn leads
to high levels of negative affect, of anxiety and hypervigilance.
This in turn would lead to a vicious cycle since the propensity
toward negative affect would bias perceptual inference in favor
of negative hypotheses in the same way as the feedback loop
mentioned above. A positive or neutral hypothesis explains only
exteroceptive signals, but is actually at odds with interoceptive
signals (with negative hedonic valence), namely, your negative
emotional state. Your nervous system effectively “reasons”: “Why
would I be afraid if this situation was innocuous?” A negative
hypothesis on the other hand explains both exteroceptive and
interoceptive signals. You instead get: “I’m afraid, therefore there
must be something to be afraid of.” This goes some way toward
explaining the hypervigilance and startle response that we see in
individuals who have undergone Type 2 trauma.
Of course, the distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 trauma
won’t always be clear-cut, and many people will present with
symptoms of both. All that you would need for this symptomatic
presentation is for a single event of cataclysmic significance
to make one multi-level hypothesis have aberrantly high prior
probability (Type 1 flashbacks) and for either that same event,
or (more likely) an extended period of threat in addition to that
one event, to lead to a general skewing of priors toward negative
hypotheses, namely, to the learnt view that the world is not a safe
place.
PTSD vs. Trauma-Based Psychosis
It is well established that there is a strong statistical relationship
between trauma and psychosis (see Morrison et al., 2003). How
does psychosis differ from PTSD, and where do we draw the line
between the two? The line may not be clear-cut in terms of the
extent to which some cases of PTSD have elements of psychosis,
but the concepts “PTSD” and “psychosis” are very different.
Psychosis, in its purest sense, means a disconnection from reality.
To the extent that one can be more or less disconnected from
reality, psychosis comes in degrees; people can be more or
less psychotic (in other words, psychosis can vary from mild
to severe). On the other hand, someone can experience PTSD
flashbacks, but recognize them as such, dismiss them as not
telling them anything about the world (and rather as revealing
something about their own mind, rather than the world) and
hence will not be disconnected from reality. They will not, as
a result, take themselves to inhabit a world that is different
from the actual world. We take it that many cases of PTSD are
non-psychotic in this sense. In psychosis, however, the person
takes herself to be living in a world that is different from the
actual world: she has an inaccurate world-view, is disconnected
from reality. Now, of course, someone could, due to their past
(i.e., involving trauma) and symptomatic presentation, have a
diagnosis of PTSD, but also present with psychosis, namely,
with some degree of disconnection from reality. There are two
questions to address here.
(i) What does this amount to in predictive processing terms?
And how does the difference between non-psychotic PTSD and
post-traumatic psychosis play out?
(ii) What does the PPF tell us about how these two different
cognitive states might arise?
The key to answering (i) lies in the hierarchical arrangement of
hypotheses. “Lower” in the hierarchy, the hypotheses correspond
to percepts. Thus, an inaccurate hypothesis at this level
corresponds to hallucination or illusion. At higher “levels” what
we are talking about are beliefs, more abstract reflections of
the subject’s world-view. Hypotheses at the lower level don’t
need to entail that hypotheses higher up fall into place: they
can be, and often are, compartmentalized. The clearest example
of this is in cases of optical illusions. You can measure the
lines in the Muller-Lyer illusion to prove to yourself that they
are the same length, but your visual system will still “believe”
that they are different lengths. Here your high-level hypothesis
(i.e., your belief) is that the lines are the same length, even
though your visual experience, determined by a lower-level
hypothesis, is telling you the contrary. To take an equivalent
but more ecologically valid example, somebody can hear a
voice, but dismiss that as merely the product of their nervous
system (Nayani and David, 1996). Alternatively, they could
update their world-view, and take there, for example, to be
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an autonomous agent who is communicating with them. The
former case is not (contrary to what some diagnostic manuals
might tell you) psychotic, whereas the latter is. Aberrant sensory
experiences need not lead to full-blown psychosis. Furthermore,
the intensity of the aberrant experiences needn’t correlate
with the extent to which the experiences are taken seriously.
This can be clearly seen in Charles Bonnet syndrome, where
subjects have intense visual hallucinations, which they always
recognize as “just in the head” and not real (Berrios and Brook,
1982).
Another factor is to do with the content of the hypotheses
selected, which constitute these experiences, and the extent to
which they can be connected to the past by the person having
the experience. In Type 1 trauma the hypothesis (and hence
the experience) is of a specific event from the subject’s past,
and so there is less temptation to think that the flashback is
part of the current world. In Type 2 trauma, the hypotheses
that correspond to the symptomatic experiences are less specific
and hence less obviously associated with the past, although the
person may still be aware of the association, and hence also able
to reject them as something that’s not happening in the here-
and-now. In psychosis, the hypotheses tend not to be highly
specific, tend not to be connectable to a distinct past event,
and they tend to be about current experience. This capacity
to appreciate whether the experience is about the past or the
present, and how the specificity of the hypotheses in question
is a factor in this, may go some way toward explaining why
some people experience psychosis after trauma (Brewin, 2015). It
also helps to explain why the line between PTSD and psychosis
is blurred (Powers et al., 2016), and more likely to be blurred
specifically between Type 2 rather than Type 1 trauma and
psychosis.
In answer to (ii), we need to give an account of what is
likely to lead to aberrant hypotheses higher up the hierarchy,
rather than the sort of compartmentalized hypotheses we see
in, for example, non-psychotic PTSD. This requires us to reflect
on the kinds of trauma and, in particular, the way in which
trauma will have different impacts at different stages of the life-
course. More pervasive aberrations are more likely to be caused
at times when basic priors are being laid down, namely, early in
life when general and fundamental learning takes place. These
basic priors may not determine specific factual beliefs, but rather
styles of thinking; general statistical appreciation of what is a
plausible inference to make. Trauma early in life, and especially
at the hands of a primary care-giver, is likely to yield a basic
lack of trust in the world (Herman, 1997). This should not
be thought of as the acquisition of a belief about the world.
Rather it should be seen as a background condition for the way
in which beliefs will be formed7. To put it in the terminology
of the PPF, it is about priors rather than specific hypotheses.
Thus, aberrant sensations are more likely, due to this skewing
of priors, to lead to aberrant beliefs: the low-level hypotheses,
more likely to yield aberrant hypotheses at higher levels in the
hierarchy.
7In phenomenological term, this is akin to what Ratcliffe (2008) calls an “existential
feeling.”
PREDICTIVE PROCESSING AND
EXISTING THEORIES
It is important to clarify the scope of our suggestion. We do not
view the PPF as a competitor to existing theories of PTSD. We see
it as compatible with, and at times as a useful reconceptualization
of, these theories. Although there are a multitude of such theories,
the following three are arguably the most influential. We present
them first, and then recast them in terms of the PPF in a way that
we think proves to be illuminating.
Conditioning Theories
Some of the earliest theories of PTSD built on theories of
conditioned response. According to these theories, the initial
traumatic event is the unconditioned stimulus, and the powerful
reaction of distress to that event is the unconditioned response.
This reaction leads to an “over-consolidation” of traumatic
memories, and reminders become conditioned stimuli, with
powerful and irrational fear responses being the conditioned
response. Sometimes the reactions are so powerful that, beyond
a straightforward fear response, there are also flashbacks.
The notion of conditioning falls very naturally out of the PPF
[see Powers et al. (2017) for a study involving conditioning-
induced hallucinations]. The PPF states that the nervous system
uses its hierarchical Bayesian machinery to “plug into” the
statistical structure of the world: and conditioning is just a form
of statistical associative learning. But something doesn’t have to
be presented lots of times in order to be given a high prior
probability, since not all stimuli have the same importance, or the
same valence. Something of extremely high importance, and high
valence, is likely to both generate and be strongly associated with
a strong experience of negative arousal (fear).
In short, conditioning theories are very much in keeping
with the PPF. It is natural to view the PPF as simply providing
the mechanism that underpins such conditioning. It is worth
mentioning that these theories seem to be most applicable to Type
1 trauma.
Emotional Processing Theories
Emotional processing theories (like the one proposed by Foa and
Kozak, 1986) argue that “complex fear structures” are stored in
memory and produce cognitive, behavioral, and physiological
reactions when “activated.” Although these structures are
important in generating adaptive reactions to danger they can
become maladaptive in certain contexts. What happens in PTSD
is that a benign stimulus becomes associated with danger and
activates these complex fear structures. This can be thought of as
a fleshed-out version of the conditioning account. Furthermore,
it should be noted that, unlike the straightforward conditioning
theory, emotional processing theories have more flexibility in
being applicable to both Type 1 and Type 2 trauma.
This account is itself further elaborated when viewed from
within the PPF. According to the PPF, whereas perceptual
experience corresponds to the hypothesis about what is going
on that best explains exteroceptive signals, emotional experience
corresponds to the hypothesis about what is going on that
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best explains interoceptive signals (Seth, 2013). In actual fact,
perceptual and emotional experience cannot be pulled apart:
perception is shot through with affect, and our experiences
(hypotheses) integrate a wealth of information both exteroceptive
and interoceptive. But our nervous systems can learn, due to
extreme circumstances, to over-react interoceptively to relatively
benign stimuli. This will activate complex hypotheses about what
is going on that aren’t simply fear, but will include perceptual and
cognitive elements too.
Cognitive Theories
Finally, there are cognitive theories like that of Ehlers and Clark
(2000), which casts PTSD in terms of beliefs or appraisals. In
short, PTSD sufferers develop excessively negative appraisals
about both the external world and themselves: they view the
world as a dangerous place, and they view themselves as
incapable. Memory recall and fear responses become biased by
these negative appraisals, and it is these appraisals that need to be
targeted by talking therapies.
Again, such an account fits nicely within the PPF. The negative
appraisals about the world and oneself may, however, take
on a different structure within the PPF. A negative appraisal
of the world could be seen, since it lacks the specificity of
any given hypothesis, as the acquisition of priors in favor of
negative hypotheses more generally. Negative self-appraisal, on
the other hand, is to do with one’s self-conception. Within the
PPF this would be viewed as the generative model for oneself,
that remains largely stable over a long period of time, and
which one carries with one and brings to bear upon every
encounter. Viewing oneself as useless and incapable will bias our
engagement with the world into fulfilling that view. Things that
aren’t really challenging will be seen as such, things that aren’t
really threatening will be seen as such, and so on. Of course, this
has all sorts of emotional upshots that feed into and bias the
lower-level machinery. This kind of holism is precisely the sort
of thing that cognitive theories would embrace, and is especially
useful for thinking about Type 2 trauma.
CONCLUSION AND CLINICAL
DIRECTIONS
We would expect Type 1 and Type 2 trauma to be responsive
to different treatments. We also get a sense of what any such
treatments would need to achieve if our account is accurate. In the
Type 1 case, we need to lower the prior probability of the “trauma
hypothesis.” This would be achieved, for example, through
gradual exposure to the maladaptive triggers. In effect this
would result in the subject re-learning the statistical relationship
(a rather lack thereof) between the traumatic hypothesis and the
triggers. In the Type 2 case, the nervous system’s faith in the world
in general needs to be restored. Pathways to achieving this are
perhaps less obvious. It would likely be a slower, more complex
process. This is born out by the generally worse prognoses of
Type 2 trauma, and the kinds of therapies that are effective (e.g.,
exposure therapy is highly effective in Type 1 cases, and much less
effective in Type 2 cases). Another tactic that might be beneficial
would be to target the interoceptive states that fuel the circular
inferences we mentioned above. Thus, perhaps a treatment of
underlying emotional states, such as anxiety, might be effective.
These treatments could be pharmacological or talking therapy-
based8. They may involve the construction, both in actual fact,
and psychologically, of a “safe space.”
Since both exposure and the creation of a safe space involve the
nervous system generating hypotheses, the richer such exposure
or safe space is, the more effective the treatment will be. This
suggests that immersive techniques such as Virtual Reality (VR)
will be more effective than narrative or even recollective and
imaginative exercises. These have been used effectively both for
exposure therapy in the contexts of trauma (Botella et al., 2015)
and in the creation of safe spaces in paranoia (Freeman, 2008).
Although highly effective in the case of exposure, it remains to
be conclusively established whether it is more effective than more
traditional forms of exposure.
How would the PPF suggest we treat dissociation? It is not
clear that peritraumatic dissociation is something that we can,
or indeed need to, treat (since it is by definition short-lived).
Post-traumatic dissociation, however, requires the hierarchy to
be reunified. This would require some sort of attentional process
(where, as we mentioned, this involves turning up the precision
on prediction error), where the precision in the lower/mid-
level of the hierarchy (wherever the “break” is) is restored. The
performing of a basic, safe, and affectively neutral task may be
helpful in this regard. EMDR is used in a wide variety of clinical
contexts, and it might be effective here (some recommend it
for dissociative disorders, see Knipe, 2008), as might something
more mundane, like playing Tetris [which Iyadurai et al. (2017)
have found reduces intrusive memories in trauma]. Indeed more
generally future research within the PPF might, in unearthing the
true mechanisms of therapeutic efficacy, demonstrate that some
of the best treatments are simple, cheap, and require little training
on the part of the therapist, and can therefore be widely and
efficiently administered.
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